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Abstract 
How much does your wage depend on what you learned, for whom you work, or what job you do? 
Using largely unexplored administrative data from Germany allows us to relate 80% of wage 
variation to observable characteristics of jobs, firms, and workers. One wage determinant stands 
out: the hierarchy level of a job, summarizing its responsibility, complexity, and required 
independence. This variable is typically absent in other data sources. Climbing the hierarchy 
ladder explains almost all of the rise in wage dispersion and half of the wage growth by age. It 
also is key to explaining gender wage differences. 
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1 Introduction
How much does your wage depend on what you have learned, for whom you work, or what
job you do? And how do the three interrelate? These questions are at the core of human
capital theory and key for our understanding of the functioning of labor markets. Their
answers shape how we think about education choices, labor market mobility, and earnings
differences, and thereby, the optimal design of tax-and-transfer systems, educational
institutions, and labor market policies. Finally, as they describe the sources of wage
dispersion across individuals, these answers have implications beyond labor markets
through the impact of labor-earnings risks on consumption-saving decisions.
We revisit these questions exploiting three waves of administrative linked employer-
employee data representative of the German economy and decompose wage growth and
rising wage dispersion over the life cycle. Using synthetic panel regressions to control for
unobserved heterogeneity (Deaton, 1985; Verbeek, 2008) allows us to identify the causal
effect of job and worker characteristics on wages and thereby to estimate how much
changes in observable characteristics contribute to wage growth and wage dispersion. We
group characteristics so as to represent three components of wages: first, an individual
component that can change without changing job or employer; second, a plant component
that will only change with a change in employer; and third, a job component that can
change over the career of a worker even within a plant.
Differences across plants shape wage dispersion at labor market entry, but it is the
job component, in particular a job’s complexity, responsibility, and independence, sum-
marized in the hierarchy level of a job, that explains 50% of wage growth and almost all
of the rising wage dispersion over the working life. We document large wage differences
across hierarchies; for example, climbing the hierarchy ladder from the lowest to the
highest level leads to more than a tripling of wages. Differences in progression along
the hierarchy ladder are also key to explaining the development of life-cycle gender wage
differences. At the beginning of their careers, females have roughly 7% lower hourly
wages than males (across all firms and jobs); at the end of their careers that difference
is more than 30%. Half of this widening gap is explained by the fact that female career
progression drastically slows down around the age of 30, while males continue to climb
the hierarchy ladder until age 50. Males and females also differ in the importance of
employer differences for wage growth. While 20% of male wage growth over the work-
ing life comes from moves to better-paying employers (controlling for worker and job
characteristics), females start to move to worse paying employers after the age of 30.
This and the lack of career progression of females are likely interrelated because not
2
all employers have the same organizational structure. Well-paying employers offer on
average also more jobs at higher levels of hierarchy.
Our database is three waves of the German Survey of Earnings Structure (SES,
2006-2014), large administrative samples that offer linked employer-employee micro data
representative for the universe of German employees and employers, working at plants
with at least 10 employees. The data contain roughly 3.2 million employee observa-
tions (roughly 10% of all employment) in each of the first two waves (a third thereof in
2014). An important feature of the data is that they are directly obtained from plants’
human resources departments. Measurement error on all characteristics can therefore
be expected to be particularly low. The data report the actual (virtually uncensored)
pay and hours worked of employees. They include detailed information on workers’
education, occupation, age, and tenure. In addition, they provide a description of the
complexity, responsibility, and independence of an employee’s job, coded as five levels
of “hierarchy.” Taken together, all information on jobs, employers, and workers explains
over 80% of the observed cross-sectional variation in wages, whereas other data sources
mostly allow us to explain one-third of wage dispersion by observables.1 Detailed in-
formation both on employers and on the hierarchy levels of jobs is equally important
for explaining the cross-sectional variation, but even when used as the single and only
explanatory factor, i.e., without any other information, five hierarchy levels explain more
than 45% of wage variation.
Our key finding that climbing the hierarchy ladder is key for wage growth and in-
creasing wage dispersion during the working life sheds new light on the question of
the specificity of human capital in the labor market. Our results point to strong job
specificity that is determined by the organizational structure of an employer. This orga-
nizational structure is independent of workers so that a high-paying (highly productive)
job persists for the employer but it is lost from the worker’s perspective when a match
resolves. But experience in a job at a given level of hierarchy is likely pivotal for finding
a new job at a comparable level. Regarding the process of human capital accumulation,
our result gives a strong hint that those skills that enable workers to climb the hierarchy
ladder are the key skills to achieving high life-cycle wage growth. These skills might be
partly innate and partly acquired through education, in particular, education toward
intellectual independence, analytical thinking, and the ability to make autonomous de-
cisions. In line with this conjecture, we find that workers with academic training make
substantially faster career progress on average.
1Although this is a high explanatory power, it is not exceptional and is also found for other admin-
istrative linked employer-employee data (see, for example, Strub et al., 2008).
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A further result of our analysis regards the importance of plants in explaining the
evolution of wage growth and wage inequality over the life cycle. We find that taking
into account hierarchy information diminishes the importance of fixed plant differences
as a determinant for wage growth and the growth of wage dispersion. This stands in
stark contrast to what explains the increase in inequality over time (Song et al., 2015).
We highlight a new channel through which plants are, in fact, important because jobs
of different levels of hierarchy are not evenly distributed across plants. Differences in
organizational structure across plants correlate with plants’ average pay. In general,
plants paying well on all levels of hierarchy also offer more jobs with high levels of
responsibility and independent decision making.2
We also provide evidence based on the National Compensation Survey (NCS), a
representative employer survey for the United States, that our results extend beyond
Germany and likely apply to most labor markets in industrialized countries. Job level
information in the NCS matches closely the hierarchy information in our data. Job levels
explain a large part of wage variation in the cross-section and even within occupational
groups in the US, too.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 puts our results into
perspective by reviewing the related literature. Section 3 introduces the data set on
which our analysis is based. Section 4 reports the results on the decomposition of wage
growth and rising wage inequality. The key finding is that some workers taking up more
responsibilities over their lifetime is key for both wage growth and wage dispersion.
Section 5 discusses which factors predict these careers. Section 6 provides a robustness
and sensitivity analysis. First, we show that hierarchy levels are also a major determinant
of US wages (Section 6.1). Second, we ask how our finding that jobs, not plants, are key
for wage growth changes when we do not use the hierarchy information (Section 6.2),
showing that plants are substantially different in the types of jobs they offer and as such
are important for wage dynamics. Section 7 concludes. An appendix follows.
2In fact, when job characteristics are ignored, plants appear to be more important in explaining
both average wage increases and the life-cycle profile of inequality. In other words, high-paying plants
are high-paying because of their job composition rather than some other intrinsic characteristics of the
plant. Hence, the average human capital in the plant determines its average wage level. On top comes
the utilization of the human capital; even fundamentally high-paying plants have a larger fraction of
jobs in higher levels of hierarchy, better-paying occupations, or other characteristics that more intensely
utilize the human capital of an employee.
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2 Related literature
Our paper focuses on exploring the sources of wage growth and inequality over the
life-cycle. In doing so, we pick up a long-standing economic research agenda, going
back at least to the seminal work of Mincer (1974), that has evolved in a large litera-
ture that has documented patterns of life-cycle wage growth and inequality, for exam-
ple, Deaton and Paxson (1994), Storesletten et al. (2004), Heathcote et al. (2005), and
Huggett et al. (2006). One part of this literature interpreted the residuals from Mincer-
style wage regressions as wage risk and estimated stochastic processes to describe this
risk. Examples are Lillard and Willis (1978), MaCurdy (1982), Carroll and Samwick
(1997), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), and Guvenen (2009). These estimated risk pro-
cesses have become a key building block of macroeconomic models with heterogeneous
agents. Recently, Huggett et al. (2011) and Guvenen and Smith (2014) took more struc-
tural approaches to explore the drivers of life-cycle inequality. A defining feature of all of
these papers is that rising life-cycle inequality results mainly from an unfolding stochas-
tic process with persistent idiosyncratic shocks. We add to this literature by relating
this stochastic process to observables, in particular, steps on the hierarchy ladder and
differences between employers. The latter relates our work to Low et al. (2010) and
Hornstein et al. (2011), who explore employer differences as a source of wage inequality
in the context of search models.
Employer differences also feature prominently in a different strand of the literature
that investigates the sources of rising wage inequality over time. Card et al. (2013) pro-
vide a particularly relevant example as they look at the case of Germany. They apply the
approach developed by Abowd et al. (1999) to four time intervals of German social secu-
rity data covering the period from 1985 to 2009. While rising worker differences and the
covariance with firms are most important in explaining rising wage inequality, rising firm
differences are also a significant contributor. Song et al. (2015) construct an impressive
new data set from social security records in the US to study rising earnings inequality for
the period from 1980 to 2015. They also apply the approach by Abowd et al. (1999) to
different time intervals and find that between-firm differences are the important driver
of rising earnings inequality. Song et al. (2015) and Card et al. (2013) both argue that
changes in the organizational structure of firms is likely the driver of rising between-firm
pay differentials. This explanation would be in line with recent evidence for Germany
in Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2017), who document the importance of organizational
changes from domestic outsourcing for wage changes especially in the lower part of the
wage distribution.
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Our findings also echo the literature on internal labor markets and career dynam-
ics within firms. Our analysis differs in its focus from the existing studies, since we
look at the importance that hierarchies and employers have for wage growth and the
increase in inequality over the life-cycle. Baker et al. (1994) provide a fascinating case
study of hierarchies, careers, and internal labor markets. They document large wage
differences across hierarchy levels, and they show that few hierarchy levels —six in
their case— suffice to represent the organizational structure of the firm and that five
hierarchy dummies explain 70% of the wage variation within this single firm. Absent
promotions across hierarchy levels, they find virtually no individual wage growth for
workers over time, and importantly for our analysis, they also provide evidence contra-
dicting the idea of reverse causality in the sense that hierarchies are determined based
on wage levels. Dohmen et al. (2004) provide another fascinating case study on the air-
craft manufacturer Fokker that corroborates the key findings from Baker et al. (1994)
for our analysis. Gibbs et al. (2003) and Fox (2009) both document for Swedish matched
employer-employee data – similar to what we find – that promotions along the hierarchy
ladder are key or even the most important source of earnings growth.
For theoretical models in this strand of the literature, Waldman et al. (2012) pro-
vide an excellent overview. At the center of his discussion are the seminal papers by
Lazear and Rosen (1981) explaining promotion dynamics as a result of tournaments and
by Waldman (1984) emphasizing the signaling role of promotions in an environment with
asymmetric information about worker ability. Lazear and Rosen’s work (1981) is of par-
ticular interest for our analysis because they provide a theory as to why rank-order wage
schemes exist in firms, i.e., wage schemes where wages do not depend on worker’s output
but on the worker’s hierarchy level in the firm. While the model in Waldman (1984)
shares the feature of a rank-order wage scheme, it emphasizes potential inefficiencies
from promotion dynamics under asymmetric information.
The organizational structure of firms is the focus of the model in Caicedo et al. (2018)
that explicitly incorporates hierarchies into the production process. In the model, a
relative shift of the worker-skill to the production-task (“problem”) distribution explains
rising wage inequality of the magnitude observed in the data. Importantly, the change
in wage inequality in the model results from the endogenously changing organizational
structure. Reduced-form empirical models like that of Abowd et al. (1999) would likely
pick this up by changing firm fixed effects and their covariance with worker effects.
Closely related is the paper by Caliendo et al. (2015), who study a sample of French
manufacturing firms. They find that an organizational structure with four layers of
hierarchy explains up to 66% of within-firm wage variation. They provide empirical
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support for the theoretical model in Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) by exploring
the dynamic evolution of hierarchies and wage structures when firms grow and shrink.
In our analysis, we will also explore the link between organizational structure and firm
wage differentials in detail. One difference with the existing literature is that we explore
the life-cycle dimension of careers in terms of hierarchy.
3 Data
We use data from the 2006, 2010 and 2014 waves of the Survey of Earnings Structure
(“Verdienststrukturerhebung”), henceforth SES, for our analysis. The SES data are an
administrative representative survey of establishments (short: plants). The survey is
conducted by the German Statistical Office and establishments are legally obliged to
participate in the survey so that selection due to non-response does not arise. The data
are employer-employee linked and contain establishment-level and employee-level infor-
mation. Establishments with 10 to 49 employees have to report data on all employees.
Establishments with 50 or more employees report data only for a representative random
sample of employees. Small establishments with fewer than 10 employees are not covered
by the data (prior to 2014). The data also contain information about an establishment’s
employment share of the total employment of the firm to which it belongs. We ex-
ploit this information to study also single plant firms in a sensitivity analysis. Data on
regular earnings, overtime pay, bonuses, hours worked, both regular and overtime, are
extracted from the payroll accounting and personnel master data of establishments and
directly transmitted via a software interface to the statistical office. Transmission error
is therefore negligible.
The data cover public and private employers in the manufacturing and service sectors.
Self-employed workers are not covered. In total, the data have information on roughly
28,700 establishments with about 3.2 million employees (in 2006, similarly in 2010, a
third thereof in 2014). The data are representative of 21 million workers in Germany.
3.1 Sample selection
For our baseline, we restrict the data to workers whose age is 25 to 55. After having
estimated the effect of observables, we split the sample by males and females when
analyzing the life cycle because male and female career paths differ substantially, as we
show. We drop very few observations where earnings are censored,3 and all observations
3The censoring limit is 1,000,000 e in 2006 and 750,000 e since 2010 in annual gross earnings. We
impose the latter throughout.
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for which the state has a major influence on the plant (75,016 employee observations in
2006, for example).4 Our wage measure is monthly gross earnings including overtime
pay and bonuses divided by regular paid hours and overtime hours. Since we use plant
fixed effects, all observations are dropped where our sample selection by age leaves us
with fewer than 10 workers at a plant.
3.2 Job complexity, responsibility, and independence: The hierarchy
variable
Importantly and different from many other data sources, our data distinguish among
five levels of hierarchy in describing the job of a worker. These hierarchy levels are
defined based on the complexity of a job (skill and typical educational requirements),
the responsibility (for one’s own work or the work of others), and the independence
(the decision making power) associated with a job.5 The lowest level is workers who
perform simple tasks (untrained workers, UT). The tasks for these workers typically
do not require particular training (such as an apprenticeship) and can be learned on
the job in less than 3 months. The second level (trained workers, TR) covers tasks
that require some occupational experience but no full occupational training (appren-
ticeship). Tasks performed at this hierarchy level can be typically learned on the job
in less than 2 years. Workers at the two lowest hierarchy levels do not undertake any
decisions independently. Only from the third level of hierarchy onwards do employees
have some discretion regarding their work. Jobs at the third hierarchy level (assistants,
AS) typically require a particular occupational training (apprenticeship) and in addi-
tion occupational experience. Workers at this level prepare decisions or take decisions
within narrowly defined parameters. An example would be a tradesman, junior clerk,
or salesman. These typically decide on everyday business transactions (e.g., a sale) and
thus have some discretion. Yet, they are not responsible for the work of others or do
they decide on tactics or strategy of the business. The fourth hierarchy group works
on tasks that typically require both specialized (academic or occupational) training and
experience (professionals, PR). Importantly, they perform their tasks independently,
they have substantial decision-making power over their cases/transactions/organization
of production, and they have some decision-making power in regard to the work of others.
Typically, these workers oversee small teams (examples would be foremen in production,
junior lawyers, heads of office in administration). The fifth hierarchy level is managers
4For a large set of observations this information is missing. The information is only available if in a
region-industry cell there are at least 3 firms in which the state has a major influence. Major influence is
defined as being a government agency, the state owning 50+ percent share, or due to other regulations.
5We discuss below similarities to modern occupational codes.
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and supervisors (management, MA). Their primary task is strategic decision making,
which requires high levels of independence and comes with substantial responsibility
regarding the work of others.
Importantly, hierarchy is neither an educational nor an occupational concept, though
both are related to hierarchy. Appendix A provides details on this along with more
detailed information on the definition of the hierarchy variable. We discuss the role of
education for career progression along the hierarchy dimension in Section 5.
3.3 Descriptive statistics and trends
Table 1 reports the number of observations for each wave as well as information on
average wages and wage inequality within our main sample. We report real wages in
constant 2010 prices using the German CPI deflator. The average real hourly wage is
roughly e20 (e16) for men (women) and has not grown much since 2006. Median real
wages have been falling from roughly e18.0 in 2006 to e17.5 in 2010 for males and
returned to e18.3 in 2014. Female median real wages have fallen from e14.7 to e14.4
between 2006 and 2010 and then grown again to e14.9. This means that female wages
are roughly 20% lower than male wages on average. Wage inequality has increased
somewhat for both genders between 2006 and 2014 and is higher among men. The
p90/p10-ratio went up from 3.1 to 3.4 for males and from 2.7 to 3.0 for females.
In addition, Table 1 reports the population shares of workers at the five different
levels of hierarchy. The share of male workers (values for females in brackets) with high
or very high independence in decision making (MA+PR) has slightly shrunk from 33.5%
(22.2%) to 32.5% (21.9%) over the three waves. The share of male (female) workers that
have autonomy only within very clearly defined limits, i.e. only in how they carry out a
given task or with respect to the substance of the question they need to decide (AS), has
increased from 43.8% (46.6%) to 48.2% (54.0%) (females in brackets), while the share of
male (female) workers that have no autonomy at all (TR+UT) went down from 22.8%
(31.2%) to 19.3% (24.1%).
In the data, the average wage of an employee increases substantially in age. The
average wage of a worker increases by roughly 2% with every year of age between age 25
and age 45 and levels off afterward. Yet, this average wage increase masks substantial
heterogeneity. Figure 1 reports the mean log wage difference to age 25 by age condi-
tioning in addition to hierarchy levels. We find that the top hierarchy group always has
the highest wage and sees the strongest increase in wages with age, so that the wage
differences between the top level and the other groups widen with age. For example and
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Table 1: Summary statistics for wages and hierarchies in the SES 2006 - 2014
Wages (in 2010 e) Pop. Share of Hierarchy (in %)
Av. Gini p10 p50 p90 UT TR AS PR MA N. Obs
Males
2006 20.5 0.26 10.5 18.0 32.8 5.8 17.0 43.4 24.3 9.5 707,490
2010 20.2 0.28 9.8 17.5 33.3 7.6 17.7 41.5 22.2 10.9 597,764
2014 21.2 0.27 10.3 18.3 34.8 5.5 13.9 45.9 23.3 11.3 192,557
Females
2006 15.9 0.22 8.7 14.7 23.8 12.5 18.9 46.2 18.6 3.9 431,449
2010 15.7 0.24 8.4 14.4 24.1 13.8 17.8 45.5 18.1 4.8 359,112
2014 16.6 0.24 8.7 14.9 25.8 9.6 15.3 51.4 18.1 5.7 127,295
Notes: “Wages” refers to the hourly wages in constant 2010 prices. “Av.” is the average and “p10/50/90”
are the 10/50/90-percentile of the wage distribution, respectively. “Pop. Share of Hierarchy” refers
to the population share of a hierarchy level in the sample population, where “UT/TR/AS/PR/MA”
are untrained, trained, assistants, professionals, and managers respectively. “N. Obs.” refers to the
unweighted number of observations in the final sample (age 25-55, no public employer).
reading age differences as if they were life-cycle profiles, a worker constantly remaining
at the assistant hierarchy level will have a 20 log point (= 22%) increase in his/her
wage over his lifetime, roughly half the average wage increase, while at the management
level, wages rise by 80 log points (123%), roughly twice the average increase. A worker
climbing up the career ladder from a job as an untrained worker to a management-level
job will see a stellar 120 log points (232%) increase in his/her wage over his/her lifetime.
This suggests that moving up the hierarchy ladder might be an important contribu-
tion to life-cycle wage growth. Other potential contributions to wage growth could be
the effects of occupational mobility, mobility toward better-paying plants, further for-
mal education, or pure returns to experience. The next section decomposes wage growth
over the life cycle into the contribution of each of these components.
For this decomposition, it is key that the SES data are exceptional in that the
worker and plant characteristics can explain more than 81% of wage variation in the
cross-section if we use plant fixed effects. Even without plant fixed effects but with
plant-level controls, 63% of wage variation in the cross-section can be explained, see
Table 5 in Appendix A.2. Part of this high explanatory power is due to the high quality
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Figure 1: Wage by age and hierarchy level
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Notes: The left panel shows the average (log) real wage by age over all workers and sample years. The
right panel shows mean (log) real wage by age and hierarchy levels. Year fixed effects have been removed.
of the data. A second part comes from, as we will show later, the fact that the data
contain information about hierarchy levels of jobs.
4 The life cycle of wage growth and wage inequality
To understand the factors that contribute to wage growth and wage inequality over
the life cycle, we estimate the effect of various plant, job, and worker characteristics
on wages. We deal with the challenge of unobserved heterogeneity by using synthetic
panel methods. A simple OLS estimator of, for example, the impact of a jobs’ hierarchy
levels on wages might be inflated because more able workers obtain higher wages at any
job and are also more likely to end up on higher hierarchy levels. The synthetic panel
methods exploit the fact that aggregation of the micro data to a cohort level creates a
panel structure (see Deaton, 1985; Verbeek, 2008, for an overview of the method).
4.1 Methodology
To be specific, assume that log wages wipt of individual i working at plant p at time t
are given as
wipt = γi + ζpt + βJJipt + βIIipt + ϵipt (1)
where Jipt is the characteristics of the job of the individual, Iipt is the characteristics of
the individual itself, γi is the worker fixed effect, and ζpt is the effect of plant p at time t.
This means that βIIipt captures the wage effect of worker characteristics that can change
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without changing job or plant, the individual component. Specifically, we use education
and age as dummies by sex.6 The job component, βJJipt, captures the characteristics
of a job that can change without changing plants. Here, we use dummies for two-digit
occupations and dummies for the hierarchy level of a job.
Since we do not have panel information on workers, but only repeated cross-sections,
we cannot directly control for unobserved heterogeneity from worker fixed effects. There-
fore, we construct a synthetic panel, defining cohorts of workers by sex, birth year and
regional information (North-South-East-West) and aggregate to the cohort level.7 To
control for plant effects, we first demean all variables at the plant level and drop plants
with fewer than 10 observations to obtain
wˆit := wipt − w.pt = γˆi + βJ Jˆit + βI Iˆit + ϵˆit, (2)
where Xˆit denotes the difference between variable Xipt for worker i and its average X.pt
at the plant where this worker is working. Thereafter, we aggregate to the cohort level
and obtain
ˆ¯wct = ˆ¯γc + βJ
ˆ¯Jct + βI
ˆ¯Ict + ˆ¯ϵct, (3)
where ˆ¯Xct denotes the average of Xˆit within a cohort c. We finally use this equation
to obtain estimates β˜J and β˜I by fixed effects OLS. The minimum observations across
cohort-year cells is 424, the maximum is 8397, and the median is 3509. Since we do not
observe any cohort over its entire life cycle, the identifying assumption is that the life
cycle is stable across cohorts.8
Using the estimated coefficients, we then calculate the plant component as wage
minus the average individual and job component at the plant. It is given by
ζ˜pt = w.pt − β˜JJ.pt − β˜II.pt. (4)
This means that our estimated plant component, ζpt, corrects the average wage at a
plant for differences in organizational structure and work force quality by removing the
average individual and job components across plants.9
6We group ages using three-year windows to identify cohort effects later on, given the four-year
distance between the three survey waves.
7The annual gross migration rate between German states in the past 30 years is low and has been
roughly 1.3% p.a.; see Wanderungsstatistik of the Statistisches Bundesamt. More than a third of this
migration is between states of the same region.
8This assumption has to be taken into account when interpreting our results. Male (female) workers
of younger cohorts work more (less) part-time and are less (more) likely to participate in the labor
market than a generation before.
9This implies that the plant component estimate will capture the average unobserved heterogeneity
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Figure 2: Wage and job component decomposition (males)
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Notes: Left panel: Decomposition of log wage differences by age relative to age 25 for male workers.
The dashed line corresponds to the individual, the dotted line to the plant, and the dashed-dotted line
to the job component; the solid line (total) equals the sum over the three components. Horizontal axis
shows age and vertical axis shows log wage difference. Right panel: Decomposition of job component
(solid line) into the contribution of occupations (dotted) and hierarchies (dashed). The graphs show the
coefficients of age dummies of a regression of the components on a full set of age and cohort dummies
(ages defined as 3-year groups).
4.2 Wage growth
Next, we use the estimates of the individual, job, and plant components to decompose
the life-cycle profiles of wages. We calculate the average wage and the three components
for all workers in an age-year cell and then regress these averages on a full set of cohort
and age dummies. We report the coefficients on the age dummies as our life-cycle profiles,
always normalizing the log wage of a 25-year-old to zero in the following figures.
We decompose the wage growth of male and female workers separately. The reason is
that, as we will see, these decompositions show very distinct patterns because males and
females have different career paths over their life cycle. We first look at males, discuss
female workers in the second step, and compare career paths in a third step.
4.2.1 Males
Our first set of results regards average wage growth for males. Figure 2(a) reports the
decomposition of mean log wages into its components. On average, wages of men grow by
of workers within a plant, too. Consequently, the estimators for the various components are consistent if
there is no assortative matching in unobserved plant and worker heterogeneity. If matching is positively
(negatively) assortative, the plant effect tends to be positively (negatively) biased. As part of the
robustness checks, we estimate the plant component based on observable plant characteristics only.
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ca. 45 log points over the life cycle.10 The job component alone can explain around 50%
of wage growth by age. Moving to better-paying plants over the life cycle contributes
to slightly more than 20% of wage growth. The remainder, the individual component,
captures pure experience effects.
Within the job component, it is promotions along the hierarchy dimension that are
key to explaining average wage growth, as Figure 2(b) shows. In fact, movements across
occupations contribute slightly negatively to wage growth, controlling for hierarchy lev-
els. In turn, most of the life-cycle wage growth results from workers taking on jobs
with increasing degrees of responsibility, complexity, and independence over the course
of their careers. We explore the relation between tenure with the same employer and
education and steps on the career ladder in Section 5.
4.2.2 Females
Female and male labor market performance is known to differ along many dimensions.
Average wages of females are lower and grow less over the life cycle. Key for this is, as
our decomposition shows, the smaller increase in the job component, in particular, the
slower move up the hierarchy ladder; see Figure 3(a). Female wages grow over the life
cycle only by 25 log points, compared to 45 log points for males. The job component
still accounts for the lion’s share (12 log points), but, compared to males (22 log points),
the average female career is substantially flatter. One reason is that between age 30
and age 45 there is virtually no growth in the job component. As for males, the job
and hierarchy components are virtually identical. The individual component for females
shows a smaller increase, too, compared to men. Interestingly, the plant component
shows a decreasing profile after the age of 30. One reason could be that the non-wage
aspects of a plant, such as its location, play more important roles for females than males
after family formation.
4.2.3 Comparing male and female careers
The result of these different career paths is that males and females earn significantly
different wages in the German labor market. Already at labor market entry (age 25),
females in our sample earn a roughly 7% lower hourly wage than males. This is close
to the official estimate of the residual gender pay gap but, as a raw average, may still
contain occupational and employer differences. At the age of 50, females earn wages that
Results are similar, except that the variance of wages explained by plant differences is smaller.
10The difference in the descriptive analysis by age as in Figure 1 stems from cohort effects.
14
Figure 3: Decomposition of wage and job component (females)
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Notes: Decomposition of average wages of female workers, otherwise see Figure 2
are more than 30% lower than wages for males. Figure 4(a) highlights how important
differential careers along the hierarchy ladder are for the widening of the gender wage
gap over the life cycle. It shows the job component from Figure 2 (males) and Figure
3 (females). Up to age 30, males and females experience an identical increase in the
job component. After age 30, the career progression of females comes to a halt, while
males keep on climbing the career ladder for an additional 10 to 15 years. The result is
an additional 10 log point wage difference between males and females at the age of 50.
This is almost half of the increase in the gender wage gap over the life cycle. Close to
all of the remaining 10 log points difference in wage growth between male and female
employees comes from differences in mobility across plants. While males continuously
move to plants that pay better on average, females after the age of 30 tend to sort into
plants that pay worse; see Figure 4(b). The different dynamics of employer mobility by
females also shows up in employer tenure by age. Figure 4 (c) shows mean tenure by
age for males and females after controlling for cohort effects. Until their mid-30s, males
and females have only a small difference in tenure of about 4 months. This difference
increases strongly afterward, and up to age 55, it has grown to almost 2.5 years. This
highlights again the diverging pattern of males and females starting after the first 10
years in the labor market, whereby females seem to end up in lower levels of hierarchy,
at worse paying plants, and with less stable jobs.
Interpreting these results as life-cycle facts and therefore extrapolating to the ex-
pected life-cycle profiles for younger cohorts of women should be taken with a grain of
salt. Our sample spans 9 years and the estimated life-cycle pattern also comes from
15
Figure 4: Job and plant component of males and females
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Notes: (a) Job component from decomposition of mean log wages for males and females. (b) Plant
component from decomposition of mean log wages for males and females. Both: Horizontal axis shows
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female workers.
Figure 5: Variance of log wages by age (raw data)
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Notes: Variance of log wages for males and females. Left panel shows males. Right panel shows females.
Horizontal axis shows age and vertical axis log wage variance.
comparisons across cohorts.
4.3 Wage inequality
It is a well-documented fact that wage and earnings inequality increases substantially
over the life cycle. Figure 5 shows the variance of log male and female wages by age
without taking any cohort effects into account. We find the typical pattern of an almost
linear increase in the cross-sectional variance for males. For females, the pattern is
similar until their early thirties and flat thereafter. Again, we first discuss males, then
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females.
4.3.1 Males
The variance of log-wages for men increases substantially over the life cycle: by 12 log
points over 30 years. Bayer and Juessen (2012) find a comparable number for average
household wages taken from SOEP data from Germany. Heathcote et al. (2010) report
for the US an increase between 17 and 20 log points over the same part of the working
life. Most existing micro data explain about 30% of the observed wage inequality by
observables. The largest part of wage inequality remains unexplained. Consequently, the
largest part of wage inequality is interpreted as the result of idiosyncratic risk captured
by a stochastic process in microfounded models of consumption-savings behavior (see
Heathcote et al., 2014, to give one example).
Given the high degree of statistical determination in our data, we can go beyond the
scope of existing studies and shed new light on the determinants of wage inequality. We
next explore the contribution of each component to wage dispersion.
In Figure 6(a) we display the life-cycle profile of wage dispersion controlling for
cohort effects. Relative to the raw data in Figure 5, the profile becomes somewhat
steeper. Over the life cycle, the variance of log wages of workers increases from roughly
10 log points to 25 log points. The variance of the plant component contributes to
wage dispersion with a constant 7 log points. The job component, by contrast, shows
an increase in its variance from 4 to 14 log points. In words, two-thirds of the total
increase in wage variance is coming from workers becoming increasingly different in the
type of job they perform. As for average wages, the hierarchy level of the job is the main
driving variable. The variance of the individual component is by construction virtually
zero: education remains mostly constant over the working life and hence does not affect
the wage dispersion within an age-cohort cell.
There are two remaining components unreported in Figure 6(a): the variance of what
is not explained and the sum of all covariance terms of observables. Figure 6(b) shows the
covariance terms by splitting the covariance into components due to covariances between
the job, individual, and plant components by age. We find that the covariance terms
are mostly close to zero on average. Yet, they show a non-negligible life-cycle pattern.
In particular, the covariances between the firm and job component and between the
individual (education) and the job component increase over the life cycle. In words,
young workers who are in high levels of hierarchy tend to be at low-paying plants and
tend to have lower levels of education. When workers age, workers at high levels of
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Figure 6: Variance-covariance decomposition (males)
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
.
25
25 30 35 40 45 50 55
Total Individual component
Plant component Job component
(a) Variance
−
.
00
5
0
.
00
5
.
01
25 30 35 40 45 50 55
Individual−job component Individual−plant component
Plant−job component
(b) Covariance
Notes: Left panel: Decomposition of the variance of log wages by age for male workers. Variances of
all components are calculated by age-cohort cell. The solid line is variance of total wage, dashed line
the individual, dotted line the plant, and dash-dotted line the job component. Right panel: Covariance
components for variance decomposition calculated analogously to the left panel; the solid line refers to the
covariance of the individual and job component, the dashed line to the covariance of the individual and
plant component and the dotted line to the covariance of the plant and job component; all covariances
are within the age-cohort cell. All graphs show the coefficients of age dummies of a regression of the
variance-covariance components on a full set of age and cohort dummies (ages defined as 3-year groups).
hierarchy are found more often in plants that pay well on average and are most likely to
have high degrees of formal education.
The sum over all covariance terms increases from -1 log point to slightly below 2 log
points over the life cycle. This means that the covariance terms contribute another 6 log
points increase to the log wage variance over the life cycle (twice the difference between
the two covariance terms). This is equal to the wage dispersion increase not explained
by the job component alone. To summarize, the dispersion in the job component and
the covariance of the job, plant, and individual components explain all of the increase
in wage dispersion over the life cycle.
In turn, we conclude that the residual wage dispersion shows no life-cycle profile. The
absence of any slope in the residual component is consistent with transitory i.i.d. wage
shocks over the life cycle. It is clearly not consistent with a large persistent component in
a stochastic process of residual wage risk that is non-related to career progression. Con-
versely, our results suggest that the source of persistent wage shocks is the progression
or the absence of progression along the hierarchy ladder.
However, this does not mean that it does not matter for whom one works. The
job-plant covariance is slightly positive on average and increasingly so over the life cycle.
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This means that well-paying plants also offer more opportunities for career progression
later in life. That the correlation is negative early in life means that workers who start
their careers at well-paying plants start there at the bottom of the hierarchy ladder but
later face ample opportunities for career progression. We further explore the implications
of the plant-job correlation for the inference about and the importance of plants in more
detail in Section 6.2.
4.3.2 Females
We have seen that women have flatter careers on average after age 30. This also has
implications for wage inequality among women. Their wage dispersion grows less in age;
see Figure 7(a). In particular, the increase in hierarchy dispersion is much smaller in
age for women than for men and levels off after age 30. Still, the life-cycle profile in
the job component explains 50% of the 12 log point increase in wage dispersion over
the working life of females (compared to 15 log points increase in variance for males).
For females, we also find a flat life-cycle profile in the plant component. At the same
time, the job-plant covariance profile is even steeper for women than for men. Those
women who end up in high levels of the hierarchy at the end of their working life work
in high-paying plants. Yet, from Figure 4 we know that later in their working life, fewer
women tend to work in high-paying plants than at the age of 30. Plainly put, it seems
that selection into careers is stronger for women than for men.
5 Who makes a career?
Given the importance of careers, i.e., moving up the hierarchy ladder, we next shed
some light on the question of how important labor market experience and eduction are
for a career. Workers at higher levels of hierarchy are both typically older and better
educated; see Table 2. Figure 8 displays how many more years of tenure a five-years-
older age group has compared to the preceding. We calculate this number by hierarchy
level to characterize how job stability changes with age and hierarchy. The figure shows
that workers at higher levels of hierarchy tend to have more stable employment histories
and increasingly so over their careers.
All of these characteristics - mobility, education, and experience - pick up some form
of past investment in human capital. As a result, they are correlated, and therefore,
we want to estimate their effects on hierarchy in a regression. Since hierarchies have
a meaning in terms of log-wages, we can use their estimated coefficients to measure
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Figure 7: Variance-covariance decomposition (females)
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Notes: Decomposition of the variance of wages of female workers, otherwise see Figure 6.
the distance between hierarchy groups, such that we end up with a cardinal measure of
hierarchy: the wage that is typically associated with it. Then, constructing the hierarchy
wage of a worker as we did before and aggregating these hierarchy wages back to the
cohort level, we use this generated variable to estimate the causal effect of an employee’s
characteristics on his/her moving up the hierarchy ladder.11
For this purpose we specify the average hierarchy wage hwct of a cohort c at time t
as a function of that cohort’s educational attainment, work experience, and tenure with
its current employer. We use the average fraction of a cohort over the three sample years
that has academic, vocational, or no training (as well as the fraction for which education
information is missing) as a measure of educational attainment and interact this with
experience. We estimate the following model:
hwct = γc + tenurec,t + tenure
2
c,t (5)
+experiencec,t ∗ (1 + educationc + genderc) + εct
The baseline effect of education on hierarchies is then not identified separately from
the cohort effect, but we can understand whether education leads to steeper or flatter
career profiles. We estimate for young, middle aged, and experienced workers separately
to allow for career slopes that vary with age. For comparison, we also calculate the
11Given the ordinal nature of hierarchy data, an ordered probit estimator would have been an alterna-
tive approach. Yet, given that we have to resort to synthetic panels in order to control for unobserved
heterogeneity, this is not straightforward, because the probit model is non-linear.
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Table 2: Share of hierarchy levels within formal education and age groups
at age 25 - 35 (in %) at age 35 - 45 (in %)
Education UT TR AS PR MA UT TR AS PR MA
Males
Secondary 25.4 38.1 26.8 7.7 2.0 18.2 39.9 29.7 9.2 3.0
Vocational 5.5 15.9 60.6 15.6 2.5 3.5 12.9 52.4 24.5 6.7
University 1.2 2.9 27.5 48.6 19.9 0.4 1.2 13.9 44.9 39.7
not reported 17.7 29.6 38.1 11.9 2.7 12.6 28.0 36.1 16.1 7.2
Females
Secondary 29.9 31.5 28.0 8.8 1.8 34.8 35.9 21.4 6.1 1.8
Vocational 5.7 13.1 64.2 15.2 1.9 6.3 13.8 57.2 19.8 3.0
University 2.0 4.6 35.1 40.3 18.1 0.9 2.9 25.1 43.8 27.3
not reported 20.1 24.7 42.4 10.8 2.0 26.9 26.1 33.7 10.5 2.9
Notes: Relative frequencies across hierarchy groups in percentage points for different age groups. Top
part of the table shows male workers, bottom part female workers. Shares sum within age groups to
100. Secondary education contains all workers with secondary education but no vocational training.
Vocational education refers to workers with secondary education and in addition a vocational degree.
University degree refers to all workers with a university or technical college degree. Workers without
reported education are in group not reported. Hierarchy groups UT/TR/AS/PR/MA refer to untrained,
trained, assistants, professionals, and managers, respectively.
estimates from a pooled cross-sectional OLS regression.
The right panel of Table 3 reports the results of the synthetic panel regression. The
left panel of the table reports the results from a pooled cross-sectional OLS regression.
The latter does not control for unobserved heterogeneity but allows us to estimate the
baseline effects of education and not only heterogeneous experience slopes. Both workers
without training and workers with academic training show steeper career paths than
workers with only vocational training. We find that workers without training or unknown
education enter the labor market on average at lower levels of hierarchy than workers
with vocational training; see Table 2 and the OLS results. One interpretation of the
steeper career path for less educated workers in the cohort fixed effects regression is that
they are catching-up in the sense that low educated workers profit from work experience,
in particular when young, exactly because they lack the formal vocational training.
On the other side of the distribution, workers with academic training enter at higher
levels of hierarchy, but then their careers further diverge from the workers with vocational
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Figure 8: Tenure gradient by age and hierarchy
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Notes: The figure displays the average additional years of tenure of an age-group relative to the preceding
one by hierarchy level. Averages over all sample years, both males and females. For 25-29-years-olds the
figure shows the average number of years of tenure in the group.
training and this divergence accelerates later in life. The size of this divergence trend
is substantial. On average workers with academic training see a 5-8 log point higher
annual wage growth due to career progression than workers with vocational training. As
we have seen before, females have flatter career profiles in their thirties than males. The
difference between males and females is insignificant early and late in their career.Job
tenure shows a positive coefficient. That is, workers in higher levels of hierarchy have
been with the same firm longer, even controlling for age and education.
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Table 3: The effect of experience, education, and tenure on career progression
Pooled Cross Section OLS Cohort Fixed Effects
age group 25-30 31-40 41-55 25-30 31-40 41-55
experience 1.1∗∗∗ 0.6∗∗∗ -0.2∗∗∗ 2.8∗∗ 0.5 -1.7∗∗∗
× female -0.3∗∗∗ -0.7∗∗∗ -0.1∗∗∗ -0.3 -0.6∗∗∗ -0.1
× academic training 2.0∗∗∗ 0.7∗∗∗ 0.1∗∗∗ 3.7 2.1 6.9∗∗∗
× only secondary education -0.3∗∗∗ -0.8∗∗∗ -0.0 15.9∗∗∗ 6.2∗∗ 5.2∗∗∗
× unknown education 0.4∗∗∗ -0.3∗∗∗ -0.3∗∗∗ -9.0∗∗ -0.3 4.9∗∗∗
tenure 1.5∗∗∗ 1.2∗∗∗ 0.8∗∗∗ 7.3∗∗∗ 3.0∗∗∗ 2.5∗∗∗
tenure2 -0.5∗∗∗ -0.3∗∗∗ -0.1∗∗∗ -8.0∗∗∗ -1.6∗∗∗ -0.6∗∗∗
female 1.7∗∗∗ 3.0∗∗∗ -6.7∗∗∗
academic training 24.8∗∗∗ 31.8∗∗∗ 41.4∗∗∗
only secondary education -12.8∗∗∗ -10.4∗∗∗ -21.0∗∗∗
unknown education -8.2∗∗∗ -4.5∗∗∗ -3.6∗∗∗
Cohort fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 360,844 740,054 1,314,769 180 300 450
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.25 0.29 0.84 0.79 0.96
Notes: *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. The left panel
displays the regression coefficients of a regression of the hierarchy wage of a worker on tenure and
experience interacted with the educational attainment of the worker and on education dummies. The
left panel displays the results of a regression of the cohort-year average log hierarchy wages on tenure
and experience interacted with the average educational attainment of a cohort controlling for cohort
fixed effects; see equation (5). Log-Wages have been multiplied by 100 to ensure better readability. The
baseline group is male workers with occupational training. We control for different male/female career
profiles by including an experience gender interaction term. Cohorts are defined by birth year, gender
and region (North/South/East/West).
6 Robustness
Next, we show based on available data for the US that our main findings are not specific
to the German labor market and shed more light on our finding of comparably small
plant effects. Further robustness checks with respect to heterogeneous job-specific wages
across workers covered by collective bargaining or not, workers working fulltime or not,
and workers working in large and small plants are reported in Appendix C.1.
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Table 4: Mean wages in 2015 by job level and occupational group
Occupational groups (SOC)
Level 11-29 31-39 41-43 45-49 51-53 All
All 38.22 12.58 17.34 23.09 17.87 23.25
1 8.55 9.63 10.01 9.25
2 9.63 10.53 14.26 12.09 10.48
3 13.01 11.15 12.83 14.78 15.62 12.89
4 15.42 13.67 16.32 18.23 19.67 16.39
5 18.80 18.84 20.14 21.11 20.95 20.13
6 20.96 21.83 24.42 27.47 24.92 23.77
7 24.63 28.03 30.56 30.67 31.27 27.17
8 32.11 33.14 38.82 34.12 32.92
9 37.50 62.13 38.32
10 42.68 44.55
11 50.65 53.26
12 69.37 73.13
Notes: Mean wages by job level and occupational groups from the 2015 National Compensation Survey.
Occupational groups follow the 2010 SOC codes. The different occupational groups correspond roughly
to Management, Business & Finance, IT & Engineering, Education, Legal, Healthcare (11-29), Service
(31-39), Sales and Administration (41-43), Farming, Construction, Maintenance (45-49), Production and
Transportation (51-53). See SOC classification for further details. Missing fields indicate the case of too
few observations for combination of job level and occupational group to be reported by the BLS. These
estimates are currently not published by the BLS and have been provided by the BLS upon request.
6.1 Hierarchies in the US labor market
It could be that the importance of hierarchies is particular to the German labor market
with its prevalence of collective bargaining agreements (which cover more than halve
of the workers in our data). Relative to this, the US labor market is a polar-opposite
case with only a very small minority of workers being covered by collective bargaining.
For this reason and to check the robustness of our findings, we look at US data from
the National Compensation Survey (NCS) run by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and
provide evidence that strongly suggests that our results on the importance of hierar-
chies generalize. We think that the reason for this is that hierarchies arise naturally in
the organization of work (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006; Caicedo et al., 2018) and
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Figure 9: Wage density across occupations by job level
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Notes: Kernel density estimates for within-group wage dispersion of log mean full-time wages. Solid line
shows dispersion within all full-time workers. Dashed line shows within-job-level dispersion and dotted
line within-occupation dispersion. Legend reports standard deviations. All data come from the 2010
National Compensation Survey. See text for further details.
compensation schemes based on job leveling are commonly used in the labor markets of
industrialized countries.12
The BLS provides detailed information that describes the job-leveling procedures in
the data. Its job leveling is distinct from its occupational coding,13 although some of the
information used for the occupational coding and for job leveling overlaps; see Appendix
B for details. We provide corresponding evidence based on the German occupational
coding (KldB) discussed in Appendix A.2.
The NCS provides information on average wages by job level both across and within
occupations. Table 4 shows mean wages by job level and occupational groups from the
2015 NCS.14 We see that within coarse occupational groups there is a very large variation
in wages across job levels. We also note that the first occupational group (11-29), which
includes management occupations and has on average much higher wages than the other
groups, actually has lower wages than the other occupational groups once we condition
on job levels. Vice versa, the relative wage differences across occupations are conditional
12In fact, job leveling is an entire industry in which consulting firms provide employers with tools to
rank jobs and implement compensation schemes for jobs at different levels. One famous example is the
point system developed by the Hay Group.
13Occupational classification schemes like the SOC used by the BLS differentiate jobs according to the
tasks but not according to the level of complexity, so that occupational codes do not imply a hierarchical
ordering but a horizontal differentiation.
14These estimates are currently not published by the BLS and have been provided by the BLS upon
an individual request for data.
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Figure 10: Shares of employees by hierarchy level and plant component
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Notes: The figure shows the share of workers by hierarchy group in plants with below or above median
estimated plant component ζ˜b. The median is defined on a worker basis. 67% of all plants have a below
median plant component.
on a job level typically small and (with one exception) less than 20%.
For 2010, we have more disaggregated occupational information for wages by job
level. In total there are 15 job levels and 307 distinct occupations. We use these data to
compare the dispersion within a job level across occupations, within occupations across
job levels, and the distribution across all job-level-occupation combinations. Since we
do not observe the number of employees, we treat each occupation-job-level pair as one
observation. Figure 9 shows the estimated kernel densities for the three distributions. We
find that the wage dispersion conditional on the job level is strongly compressed relative
to the unconditional wage dispersion and also relative to the wage dispersion conditional
on occupations. The standard deviation of wages decreases by 45% conditioning on 307
occupations and by 68% conditioning on only 15 job levels relative to the unconditional
standard deviation; again see Figure 9.
We conclude that conditional on the job level, a large part of the observed uncondi-
tional occupational wage differences disappears, which suggests that the importance of
hierarchies (job levels) also applies to the US labor market. Similarly, we find that our
results are robust if estimate the hierarchy wages from workers not covered by collective
bargaining agreements; see Appendix C.1.
6.2 The (un)importance of plants
One result of our analysis is that the plant component does not contribute much to
wage dispersion growth over the life cycle. At the same time, recent evidence for the
US finds increasing firm differences to be a key driver of the increase in wage inequality
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over the past 30 years (Song et al., 2015). At a first glance, these two pieces of evidence
do not seem to align well. However, we have seen that the plant component and the job
component are positively correlated and increasingly so over the life cycle of a worker.
This implies that the plant component will pick up the organizational structure of plants,
too, if we do not include information about this structure in the analysis.
Figure 10 reports the share of jobs at various levels of hierarchy for jobs sorted by
the plant component ζp. Well-paying plants offer on average more jobs at higher levels
of hierarchy; only low-paying plants offer a substantial fraction of jobs on the lowest
two hierarchy levels, this echoes the findings of Tåg et al. (2013) for Sweden. Note for
this figure we sort plants according to whether they pay better at all levels of hierarchy,
i.e., the plant component is not driven by having a larger share of top-level workers.
Well-paying plants are on average also substantially larger. In turn, the bottom 50% of
jobs by plant component are in the bottom 67% of plants.
In turn, decomposing wages ignoring the terms that go into the job component
leads to a pattern that is different from our baseline that includes this information.
First, a substantially larger fraction of wages remains unexplained. More important,
throwing away the job information leads to an overestimation by roughly 30% of the
role of mobility between plants for wage growth, as Figure 11 shows. Similarly, the
contribution of plants to the wage inequality is inflated by 50% and both education and
mobility across plants become important contributors to the increase in wage dispersion
over the life cycle; see Figure 12. Together, the individual and plant components explain
roughly 8 out of the 15 log point increase in the wage variance. The covariance between
the individual and plant components also contributes to the growth of wage inequality
by 2 log points (not displayed). This means that, without job information, residual
wage inequality has a life-cycle profile, contributing another 5 log points to the increase
in wage dispersion. This is in stark contrast to what we find when we include the job
information, where residual wage inequality is both negligible and has a flat life-cycle
profile.
In summary, this means that plants are important for life-cycle wage dynamics, but
not because of their wage level differences but because of their differences in organiza-
tional structure whereby different plants offer different career paths. These differences
in organizational structure are correlated with average plant pay and get partly picked
up by the plant component when organizational structure is unobserved.
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Figure 11: Decomposition of mean wage by age (males), ignoring job information
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Notes: See Figure 2 for the left panel. The right panel displays the corresponding components from
Figure 2 (a) for comparison.
Figure 12: Decomposition of variance of wages by age without job controls (males)
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Notes: See Figure 6 for the left panel. The right panel displays the corresponding components from
Figure 6 (a) for comparison.
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7 Conclusions
The present paper analyzes wage data from the German Survey of Earnings Structure.
We find that both wage growth and the increase in wage dispersion over the life cycle can
be well explained by observable characteristics of jobs, plants and workers. In particular,
the responsibilities, independence, and complexity of a job, the job’s hierarchy level, is
the most important factor. Tertiary education seems particularly important to prepare
workers for jobs at the top hierarchy levels as workers with academic training on average
progress faster along the career ladder. Mobility between employers does not contribute
to career progression.
This has a broad range of implications. For example, educating future workers in
the ability to take responsible decisions has likely high returns and is key for structural
transformation. In fact, well-paying plants seem to have shorter spans of control of
top-level workers and more workers who need less supervision. Similarly, our findings
suggest that changes in organizational structures within firms may be important in our
understanding of wage inequality and its developments over time.
From the individual’s perspective, our results imply that career progression and job
search also within firms is key to understanding wage risks. Residual wage risk that
cannot be linked to any observables is small and has a flat life-cycle profile once the
hierarchy information of jobs is taken into account. This further suggests that persistent
wage risk is related to other macroeconomic factors, such as structural change. Similarly,
it suggests that the average life-cycle wage growth and wage dispersion are linked because
both result from career progression. This further suggests that wage risk differs across
individuals. In particular, male and female workers show both different average wage
growth and different wage dispersion after the age of 30, when female career progression
slows down substantially.
At an aggregate level, our results raise the question of how many congestion exter-
nalities organizational structures generate: even when a worker might be qualified for a
job further up the hierarchy ladder, that job may already be filled. In turn, we conclude
that plants are important through their difference in organizational structure, which
implies that plants differ vastly in the career opportunities they offer. At the same time,
differences in pay across plants that are not related to job characteristics seem to be a
minor contributor to wage growth and do not contribute at all to the increase in wage
dispersion over the life-cycle. This suggests that the plant-related differences in pay are
known to workers and therefore workers do not need to search for higher wages across
plants. Instead, the lacking age profile in the dispersion of the plant component suggests
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that the differences are compensating differentials.
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A Further details on the German SES data
A.1 Data collection and explanatory power of observables
The wage data in the German SES are transmitted to the statistical offices directly –
and in most cases automatically – from the human resources and payroll accounting
departments of firms. Therefore, the data contain very little measurement error. For
that reason, and mostly because we observe the hierarchy level of a worker, explanatory
variables have high explanatory power; see Table 5. The table shows the R2 statistics
from a descriptive regression of log worker wages on various sets of observables. Both,
hierarchies and plants are important in explaining wage dispersion. What stands out,
however, is that five levels of hierarchy can explain close to 46% of wage variation. At the
same time, we see that the R2 of a regression that combines both plant and hierarchy
effects is smaller than the sum of the R2 statistics of the separate regressions. This
reflects the important correlation between plants and hierarchies we have documented.
Table 5: Importance of characteristics in explaining hourly wages
Plants Hierarchies Hierarchies
and plants
Hierarchies, plants,
occupations, edu-
cation, experience,
tenure, and sex
Hierarchies, plant
size, collective bar-
gaining, region, and
industry
(adj.) R2 0.581 0.459 0.779 0.812 0.625
Notes: Adjusted R2 of different regressions on log wages. All regressions contain year fixed effects
as additional regressors. First column regression only on plant fixed effects, second column only on
hierarchy dummies, third column on hierarchy dummies and plant fixed effects, the fourth column
on hierarchy dummies, plant fixed effects, occupation dummies, education, experience, tenure, sex,
and interaction dummies, and the fifth column on hierarchy dummies, plant size dummies, dummy for
collective bargaining,regional dummies, and industry dummies.
A.2 Additional details on the hierarchy variable
In the German data, the hierarchy variable is coded in five levels. Hierarchical con-
cepts are of course also prevalent in collective bargaining agreements and hence there
is a mapping from job descriptions in collective bargaining agreements to the hierarchy
variable in our data. Typically collective bargaining agreements have more detailed job
descriptions and job leveling.
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Relatedly, hierarchy levels are associated with a typical education level. Education
is, however, neither a prerequisite for any hierarchy nor do all workers with a certain
education work at a given hierarchy level or above. The hierarchy classification captures
a functional concept within an establishment, not a qualification concept. Hence, hier-
archy, while correlated with formal education is a job- (i.e. task-)specific concept, while
education captures past investments in human capital. As we have seen from Table 2, a
substantial fraction of workers is employed at all hierarchy levels for virtually any level of
formal education (with the exception maybe of extreme combinations) and that workers
progress along the hierarchy dimension as they get older, both of which clearly indicates
that formal education and the hierarchy variable measure two distinct concepts.
It is also important to note that hierarchy classification is distinct from the occu-
pational classification of jobs. Hierarchy levels vertically distinguish jobs in terms of
their complexity and decision-making power. Occupational classifications distinguish
workers horizontally by the type of task that is done. One example is the 3-digit oc-
cupation “food preparation”: within this occupation there can be different hierarchy
levels capturing the differences between dishwashers, kitchen assistants, commis, chefs
de partie, and sous and head chefs. In addition, measures of occupation seem to be
plagued with measurement error in many survey data sets, e.g., the CPS (see, e.g.,
Kambourov and Manovskii, 2013), which we can expect to get stronger the higher the
level of disaggregation. Having said this, the recent revisions of 5-digit occupation codes
have started to measure and encode job complexity (Helper/Trained/Specialist/Expert)
(ISCO-08 or KldB-2010 for Germany). Table 6 shows a cross-tabulation of the last digits
of the occupational classification system KldB2010 of the German employment agency
against a job’s hierarchy information. While the two are positively correlated, there is
still a substantial mass off diagonal.
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Table 6: Cross-tabulation of hierarchy measured directly and hierarchy inferred from
occupation codes
Complexity
measured by
occupation
Fraction of
occupation
(in %)
Fraction of hierarchy within occupation (in %)
UT TR AS PR MA
All 100 6.4 13.4 50.1 19.9 10.4
from last digit (KldB 2010)
Helper 13.4 29.6 40.4 27.4 2.0 0.6
Trained 55.6 4.0 13.2 69.2 11.3 2.4
Specialist 15.8 0.7 2.9 35.8 50.9 9.6
Expert 15.2 0.5 1.1 14.7 34.7 48.9
using management occupations (KldB 2010)
Supervisors 2.3 0.9 3.3 32.8 42.1 20.9
Managers 2.9 0.6 1.3 15.9 30.5 51.6
Notes: Cross-tabulation of hierarchy and job information provided by the German Statistical Office
based on data from the 2014 Survey of Earnings Structure. Occupational information extracted from 5-
digit occupational code (KldB 2010). First part of the table (last digit) shows the distribution of workers
by occupational complexity across hierarchy groups. Shares sum to 100 within each row. First column
(total) shows population share of occupation group. Second part of the table (management occupations)
shows distribution of occupations coded as supervisors or managers across hierarchy groups. Shares
sum to 100 within each row. Numbers in column total refer to share of workers coded as supervisors or
managers in the total population.
B Additional details on the hierarchy variable in the US
National Compensation Survey
The US National Compensation survey classifies all jobs according to their occupation
and their job level. Occupations are coded using the Standard Occupational Classifica-
tion (SOC) system based on the skill levels and primary duties. For the job leveling,
the BLS interviewers evaluate the duties and responsibilities of a job. The method used
to classify jobs is point factor leveling and it assigns points to particular aspects of the
duties and responsibilities of the job. It also takes into account the skills, education, and
training required for the job. Hence, there is some overlap with occupation codes. In
contrast to the occupation coding, the job leveling aims to evaluate jobs with respect to
required knowledge, job controls and complexity, contacts on the job in terms of nature
and purpose, and a job’s physical environment. Jobs are evaluated for each of these four
factors and the job level is the sum of level points from all four factors. Importantly, the
job leveling is based on responsibility and not on assigned job titles in establishments.
35
The BLS then groups jobs in up to 15 job levels. See the US Bureau of Labor Statistics
(2013) Job Level Guide for further details.
C Sensitivity analysis and further material
We provide several sensitivity analysis to our baseline analysis from the main part of
the paper. In the sensitivity analysis, we explore the effects of being not covered by a
collective bargaining agreement, full-time work, large establishments, and using plant
controls instead of plant fixed effects.
C.1 Heterogeneous returns to job and individual characteristics
For the first set of sensitivity analysis, we interact variables from the baseline regression
in equation (3) with dummy variables for being not covered by a collective bargaining
agreement, for working full-time, and working in a large establishment. In table 7, we
compare the baseline sample to the part of the sample that gets a positive dummy in
the sensitivity analysis. Overall, there are differences in the hierarchy composition in
the alternative groups compared to the baseline sample, but they are not striking.
In the first step, we test if the estimated coefficients on the additional interaction
terms are statistically significant. Table 8 shows test statistics for three tests for the three
different interaction specifications. The first row jointly tests all interaction coefficients.
We find that insignificance can be always strongly rejected. When we look more closely
at the different components, we find that the coefficients on the interaction terms with
the variables of the job component (third row) are always strongly significant. The
coefficients on the interactions with the individual component are insignificant in the no
collective bargaining case and significant in the two other cases (second row). The main
part of the paper finds that hierarchy is the key variable of the job component to explain
both wage growth and dispersion over the life cycle. When we look at the coefficients of
the interaction terms with the hierarchy dummies, we find them to be always strongly
statistically significant (fourth row).
This means that we potentially have ignored an important heterogeneity in our base-
line treatment. Yet, the test results in table 8 only talk about statistical, not economic
significance. The same careers e.g. across hierarchy levels and occupations can poten-
tially mean something different when the coefficients, i.e. the returns to occupation and
hierarchy, are much different for fulltime workers or workers not covered by collective
bargaining.
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Table 7: Summary Statistics
baseline no collective only large plants
bargaining fulltime
wage 18.9 17.8 19.8 21.9
age 41.1 40.6 40.8 41.3
female 38.8 37.8 27.1 37.2
UT 8.5 7.4 6.5 8.1
TR 16.6 19.2 15.5 14.6
AS 45.2 49.0 44.9 40.6
PR 21.3 17.2 23.3 25.5
MA 8.3 7.2 9.8 11.3
N (million) 2.4 1.3 1.9 0.9
Notes: Descriptive statistics of sample composition for baseline sample and subsamples considered in
sensitivity analysis. Wage and show average wage and age for sample. Female is the share of females in
the sample, UT, TR, AS, PR, and MA show the shares for workers on the different hierarchy levels in
the samples, N is the number of observations in million of the different samples.
Given the importance of the job component in the main part of the paper, we fo-
cus here on the changes in the job component, when discussing economic significance
and sensitivity of our results. Figure 13 shows the job component from the baseline
specification together with the specifications from the different sensitivity specifications.
For all specifications that include dummy interaction terms (no collective bargaining,
full-time, large plants) we treat keep the evolution of the characteristics of jobs over
the workers’ life-cycle as in the baseline sample, but treat them with the wage schedule
for the subgroup we estimated the interaction terms for, i.e., we ask what would the
wage profile of workers look like if all got non-collectively bargained wages. Of course
this assumes that neither the career paths along hierarchy ladders nor the wage-schedule
would change when there would be no collective bargaining. This has to be taken into
account when comparing the different job components.15
Figure 14 shows the contribution of the job component to the increase of the variance
of log wages over the life-cycle for the baseline and the different sensitivity specifications
15This assumes that there are no equilibrium effects on the organizational structure if there are for
example only plants without collective bargaining agreements in the market.
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Table 8: Test statistics for coefficient tests
no collective bargaining only fulltime large plants
p-value F-stat p-value F-stat p-value F-stat
all 0.00 3.6 0.00 3.5 0.01 1.8
individual 0.25 1.2 0.00 3.4 0.00 2.0
job 0.00 7.3 0.02 2.0 0.01 2.3
hierarchy 0.00 17.0 0.00 3.9 0.00 4.4
Notes: Test statistics for joint significance of interaction coefficients with wage component coefficients.
Row all shows test results for joint significance of all interaction terms, row individual shows test statistics
for coefficients of individual component, row job shows test statistics for coefficients of job component,
and row hierarchy shows test statistics for the joint significance of the hierarchy-interaction dummies.
See text for further details.
using the same technique. In contrast to the presentation in the main part of the paper,
we removed level differences at age 25 for easier comparison.
We find that hierarchy returns in wages are more diverse when the worker is not cov-
ered by a collective bargaining agreement. This reflects that there is wage compression
in collectively bargained wages. In turn, the age-wage profile (for the job component)
would look steeper had no worker collectively bargained wages. Analogously, without
collectively bargained wages, wage dispersion would increase much more over the life-
cycle. For large plants we find the reverse, yet, this is likely the effect of them having a
larger fraction of workers with collectively bargained wages.
The effect of working full time is more nuanced. The average growth in the job
component is stronger, but without increasing the dispersion over the life cycle. In other
words, the wage premia for full time workers are larger in the middle of the hierarchy
distribution AS to PR but the hourly wages of lowest and highest hierarchy workers very
similar across full time and part time.
C.2 Correlations
Figure 15 expresses the covariances displayed in 6 (b) and 7 (b) in terms of correlations.
The individual component and job component show the strongest life-cycle profile in
terms of correlations. This reflects the finding that better educated workers have steeper
career paths.
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Figure 13: Contribution of job component to log wage change over the life cycle
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Notes: Contribution of job component to log wage differences by age relative to age 25 for male (left
panel) and female (right panel) workers. The solid line shows the job component for the baseline from the
main part of the paper, the short dashed line shows the case with no collective bargaining interaction,
the dotted line the case with full-time interaction, and the dash-dotted line the case with large firm
interaction. Job components have been constructed with setting all dummy variables in the interaction
terms to one. All graphs show the coefficients of age dummies of a regression of the variance-covariance
components on a full set of age and cohort dummies (ages defined as 3-year groups).
Figure 14: Contribution of job component to variance change over the life cycle
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Notes: Contribution to the change of the variance of log wages by age for male (left panel) and female
(right panel) workers of the job component. Variances of all components are calculated by age-cohort cell
and variance at age 25 is subtracted. The solid line shows the job component for the baseline from the
main part of the paper, the short dashed line shows the case with no collective bargaining interaction,
the dotted line the case with full-time interaction, and the dash-dotted line the case with large firm
interaction. Job components have been constructed with setting all dummy variables in the interaction
terms to one. All graphs show the coefficients of age dummies of a regression of the variance-covariance
components on a full set of age and cohort dummies (ages defined as 3-year groups).
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Figure 15: Correlations between individual, plant, and job component
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Notes: See Figures 6 (b) and 7 (b). The present figure displays correlation coefficients instead of
covariances.
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